7 Hidden Truths About ARM Chip Companies That Could Risk Your Security

ARM chip companies have created the most ubiquitous processors on the planet, with nearly 29 billion ARM-based chips shipped in 2024 alone — that's four chips for every human on Earth. While these semiconductors power everything from smartphones to smart fridges, few users understand the potential security risks lurking beneath their sleek exteriors.

Unlike traditional processor manufacturers such as Intel and AMD, who have dominated desktop computing since the early 1970s, ARM operates on a different business model. Instead of manufacturing chips directly, ARM designs chip architecture and licenses intellectual property to other companies. However, this approach potentially obscures accountability when security vulnerabilities emerge.

The concerns are far from theoretical. Similar to how Intel's Management Engine can access RAM and network devices without user knowledge, many ARM-based systems contain hidden subsystems that operate independently of the main processor. Additionally, these chips face threats like Specter and Meltdown vulnerabilities that have affected processors manufactured over the past five years, potentially allowing attackers to access previously protected data. Despite ARM's growing market presence, these security implications deserve closer scrutiny.

ARM Chips May Contain Undocumented Instructions

Undocumented features lurk within the silicon of processors created by ARM chip companies, posing potential security risks that most users never consider. These hidden elements represent a significant but often overlooked aspect of processor security.

What are undocumented ARM instructions?

Undocumented ARM instructions are machine code operations that processors recognize and execute, yet aren't officially documented in the instruction set architecture (ISA) specifications. In technical terms, an instruction is considered undocumented when "the processor recognizes the instruction word as valid but it does not encode for a valid instruction according to its instruction set architecture"

These instructions exist in a gray area of processor functionality. Although they perform operations within the chip, they remain invisible to most software developers and security researchers because they don't appear in official documentation. ARM-based processors, like many other architectures, contain "holes" in their ISA where bit patterns are left undefined or marked as "unpredictable" ^[2].

The Thumb instruction set, a compressed form of ARM instructions, contains several such undefined instructions. When executed, these instructions might behave in ways not intended by the chip designers, potentially allowing privileged operations or revealing sensitive information. For example, researchers discovered an undocumented instruction on a RISC-V chip during systematic testing ^[1].

Why undocumented instructions exist in ARM chips

Undocumented instructions exist in ARM chips for several legitimate reasons, although their presence raises security concerns:

1. Debugging and testing purposes: Many undocumented features are implemented by engineers for internal debugging or factory testing. For instance, Kaspersky researchers discovered that Operation Triangulation attackers exploited an undocumented hardware feature in Apple-designed SoCs that was "most likely intended to be used for debugging or testing purposes by Apple engineers or the factory, or that it was included by mistake" ^[3].

2. Experimental features: Engineers sometimes implement experimental instructions that aren't ready for public release. As one expert notes, "It could be an experiment for a new feature. It could be there for testing something. It could be a feature that is incomplete or failed to work" ^[4].

3. ROM patching mechanisms: Some undocumented instructions support hardware-level patches. During reverse engineering of the NXP LPC55S69 ROM, researchers discovered "an undocumented hardware block intended to allow NXP to fix bugs discovered in the ROM by applying patches from on-device flash as part of the boot process" ^[5].

4. Reserved for future use: Some undocumented instructions are placeholders reserved for future extensions to the architecture. The ARM manual explicitly states these instructions "must not be used, because they can be defined later" ^[2].

   

Security implications of hidden ARM instructions

The security risks posed by undocumented ARM instructions are substantial and multifaceted:

System instability and unpredictable behavior: Undocumented and faulty CPU instructions can cause undefined behavior and system instability, undermining software efforts for OS crash recovery and resilience ^[1]. This unpredictability makes systems harder to secure.

Bypassing hardware security protections: Perhaps most concerning, these hidden features can completely undermine hardware-based security. As Kaspersky researchers noted regarding the Operation Triangulation exploit: "advanced hardware-based protections are useless in the face of a sophisticated attacker as long as there are hardware features that can bypass those protections" ^[3].

Exploitation by sophisticated attackers: The very existence of undocumented features creates potential attack vectors. Researchers noted with concern, "We do not know how the attackers learned to use this unknown hardware feature or what its original purpose was" ^[3]. This suggests sophisticated attackers may already be exploiting undocumented features in ARM chips.

Breaking security boundaries: In some cases, undocumented instructions allow "attackers to make runtime modifications to purportedly trusted APIs, allowing them to potentially hijack future execution and subvert multiple security boundaries" ^[5]. Furthermore, these instructions can impact reliability because "crash recovery methods often rely on fail-stop semantics in case an incorrect instruction is executed" ^[1].

Security through obscurity failure: Attempts to provide "security through obscurity, such as preventing read access to ROMs or leaving hardware undocumented, have been repeatedly shown to be ineffective" ^[5]. Rather than enhancing security, the lack of transparency about processor operations actually undermines it.

Consequently, the increasing societal dependence on computer systems strengthens the need for verification and auditing. Nevertheless, "the underlying processor executing said software is more often than not regarded as a trusted black box, with little to no possibility for end users to verify the absence of secret functionality" ^[6]. This creates a troubling blind spot in our overall security posture.

ARM-Based Systems Often Include Hidden Subsystems

Beyond the primary ARM processor cores that execute user-visible code, ARM-based devices frequently contain sophisticated, yet largely hidden subsystems that most users never know exist. These secondary processing environments create significant security challenges through their inherent lack of transparency and potential for exploitation.

What are ARM hidden subsystems?

Hidden subsystems in ARM architectures are specialized hardware components that operate alongside the main processor but function independently with their own privileged access rights. Most notably, ARM's recent architecture designs incorporate security subsystems specifically built to handle sensitive operations like encryption, authentication, and secure boot processes.

In particular, many modern ARM chip designs include dedicated security subsystems that incorporate:

• Key storage boxes for securing secret encryption keys
• Hardware encryption engines for high-speed cryptographic operations
• Secure boot mechanisms to validate code integrity during startup
• Isolated execution environments that operate independently from the main system

As stated by Socionext, a prominent ARM chip designer, "The security subsystem includes a dedicated key storage box to store highly secret key information" ^[7]. These subsystems have become essential components in modern computing, especially with "the recent progress of IoT (Internet of Things)" ^[7] where security requirements have intensified.

Moreover, ARM has introduced a revolutionary concept called "Realms" as part of their Armv9 architecture. This represents "a concept that's familiar to software architects, but perhaps foreign to hardware engineers: execution in isolation" ^[8]. Essentially, Realms creates completely isolated execution threads with "no connection to any threads in which the operating system, or any system services, would be run" ^[8].

How these subsystems operate independently

The defining characteristic of these hidden subsystems is their ability to function autonomously from the main processor. As noted in technical documentation, "This behavior reflects the System-on-Chip (SoC) nature of ARM Cortex-M processors, where different subsystems operate independently of the processor's state" ^[3].

This independence creates a unique security paradigm where subsystems can:

1. Continue operations even when the main processor is in sleep mode or powered down
2. Access memory regions without the knowledge or permission of the main OS
3. Execute privileged operations without user awareness
4. Maintain their own security states separate from the primary system

The Memory Tagging Extension (MTE), another ARM security feature, exemplifies this complex relationship. Introduced "in the ARM architecture to detect memory corruption vulnerabilities" ^[5], MTE assigns unique tags to different memory regions and verifies tag matches during memory access. Nonetheless, researchers have demonstrated that "MTE tags can leak with a success rate higher than 95% in less than 4 seconds" ^[9], highlighting how even well-designed security subsystems can be compromised.

Potential for surveillance or data leaks

The existence of these hidden subsystems creates concerning possibilities for unauthorized surveillance and data extraction. In fact, security researchers from Seoul National University and Samsung Research recently discovered that "ARM could be vulnerable to memory corruption, as the feature guarding against such vulnerabilities could be easily bypassed" ^[5].

Using techniques they named TIKTAG-v1 and TIKTAG-v2, researchers demonstrated how "real-world attacks could occur against Chrome, Linux kernel, and Google Pixel 8" ^[5]. These attacks exploit "the processor's speculative behaviors to leak sensitive information in a so-called speculative execution attack, similar to Specter and Meltdown" ^[5].

Similarly, academic researchers identified a vulnerability in Apple's M-series chips that "allows attackers to extract secret keys from Macs when they perform widely used cryptographic operations" ^[10]. The flaw stems from the chips' data memory-dependent prefetcher (DMP), a hardware optimization that "reduces latency between the main memory and the CPU" ^[10].

Perhaps most concerning, ARM's widespread adoption means these vulnerabilities affect billions of devices. As stated in technical reports, "ARM, a computer processor architecture with a reduced instruction set, dominates the mobile phone and tablet market, powers many gadgets, and is increasingly gaining popularity in laptops and PCs" ^[5].

The fundamental challenge with ARM hidden subsystems is that they create a complex security landscape where "security through obscurity" approaches ultimately fail. When these subsystems operate invisibly to users and security researchers alike, identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities becomes exceedingly difficult.

Closed-Source Firmware Limits Transparency

Firmware serves as the crucial bridge between hardware and software in ARM-based devices, yet most ARM chip companies keep this code tightly guarded. The proprietary nature of firmware in the ARM ecosystem creates a digital black box that few can peer into, raising significant security concerns.

What is closed-source firmware in ARM chips?

Closed-source firmware refers to the proprietary software embedded within ARM-based processors that controls hardware functionality but remains inaccessible for public inspection. Unlike open-source alternatives, this code cannot be freely examined, modified, or verified by independent security researchers or end users.

For domestic ARM chips acquired through licensing, the closed-source nature of ARM's architecture fundamentally impedes independent security audits and structural corrections ^[2]. This situation worsens as licensing restrictions tighten, leaving manufacturers with growing constraints on modification freedoms ^[2].

At its core, ARM firmware includes critical components:

• Boot sequences that initialize hardware
• Security management modules
• Protocol stacks for communication
• Hardware abstraction layers

These components execute at privileged levels, often with direct access to sensitive hardware features. Currently, most ARM implementations rely on binary blobs—code that must be sent to devices to make them work but cannot be inspected or modified ^[4].

Why lack of transparency is a security risk

The lack of firmware transparency introduces several substantial security risks:

Firstly, closed-source code prevents independent verification. As one expert explains, "While it is true that the bad guys don't have access to their source code, it means that the good guys don't have access to it either" ^[11]. This fundamentally limits the ability to identify vulnerabilities before malicious actors discover them.

Secondly, firmware opacity creates accountability gaps. When vulnerabilities emerge, determining responsibility becomes challenging due to ARM's complex licensing model where multiple parties contribute to the final product.

Thirdly, binary blobs create "black box" situations where security researchers must rely on guesswork rather than direct analysis. "The application itself becomes a black box. You can feed data in and get data out, but the internal workings may as well be magic" ^[11].

Regarding processor security, this lack of transparency is particularly troubling since "the underlying processor executing said software is more often than not regarded as a trusted black box, with little to no possibility for end users to verify the absence of secret functionality" ^[12].

Examples of firmware obfuscation in ARM devices

ARM-based device manufacturers frequently employ deliberate obfuscation techniques to further complicate security analysis:

Patent documentation reveals that companies implement "ARM processor-based file obfuscation methods" specifically designed "to make it difficult to grasp the flow of a program using reverse engineering" ^[13]. These techniques include:

1. Encrypting execution code sections and storing them in unique locations
2. Inserting specialized decryption routines
3. Manipulating header and section information to confuse debugging tools
4. Filling sections referenced by debuggers with dummy data ^[13]

Advanced firmware obfuscation methods seen in commercial ARM devices include "swapping a subset of instructions" so that "an adversary cannot make a program work completely without knowing which instructions have been swapped" ^[14]. This approach proves particularly effective because "the program will execute in the wrong sequence and produce the incorrect result" ^[14].

Unfortunately, with vendors leveraging "increasingly advanced obfuscation and encryption techniques to protect the confidentiality of their code, finding vulnerabilities can be especially challenging" ^[15]. Particularly concerning is when "firmware itself becomes a challenge to reverse, if it was compiled for an obsolete architecture and commercial disassemblers can't properly reconstruct it" ^[15].

Ultimately, these obfuscation practices exist primarily to protect intellectual property rather than enhance security. Indeed, security experts widely acknowledge that "security through obscurity, such as preventing read access to ROMs or leaving hardware undocumented, have been repeatedly shown to be ineffective" ^[12].

ARM’s Licensing Model Can Obscure Accountability

Unlike traditional semiconductor companies, ARM's unique business model centers on intellectual property licensing rather than direct chip manufacturing. This licensing approach creates a complex web of relationships that can mask who is ultimately responsible for security vulnerabilities.

How ARM chip design companies license IP

The ARM chip company operates fundamentally differently from conventional chip makers through a tiered licensing structure. At the core of this business model, ARM offers several distinct license types:

• Architecture licenses grant partners the right to design their own custom processors that implement the ARM instruction set. Companies like Apple, Qualcomm, and Samsung hold these premium licenses, allowing them to create custom ARM-compatible cores.

• Processor licenses permit companies to integrate pre-designed ARM cores (like Cortex-A or Cortex-M series) into their chips without modifying the core design itself.

• Physical IP licenses provide access to optimized hardware designs for specific manufacturing processes, including memory cells and standard cell libraries.

This multi-layered approach has proven enormously successful, enabling ARM to permeate virtually every segment of computing without manufacturing a single chip themselves. Meanwhile, the company maintains strict control over its intellectual property through contractual agreements that limit what licensees can modify or disclose.

Why licensing complicates security oversight

The distributed nature of ARM's licensing model creates significant challenges for security oversight across several dimensions:

First, the fragmentation of responsibility makes comprehensive security evaluation nearly impossible. When security researchers identify a vulnerability, determining which entity in the supply chain should address it becomes problematic. Given that multiple companies contribute to the final product—ARM provides the architecture, chip designers customize implementations, and device manufacturers integrate these components—accountability becomes diffused.

Second, licensing agreements often include non-disclosure provisions that prevent transparent security discussions. These contractual constraints can inhibit the sharing of crucial security information among researchers, vendors, and users.

Third, the variety of implementation approaches adds complexity. Each licensee may implement ARM designs differently, resulting in unique security profiles that require individualized assessment. Consequently, a vulnerability affecting one implementation may not affect others in the same way, complicating coordinated responses.

Who is responsible when things go wrong?

When security vulnerabilities emerge in ARM-based systems, the question of responsibility often remains unanswered due to the distributed nature of the ecosystem:

At the architectural level, ARM provides the fundamental design but typically limits its responsibility to the integrity of its reference designs. Subsequently, chip designers who license ARM technology assume responsibility for their specific implementations, but may attribute flaws to the underlying architecture or manufacturing process.

Device manufacturers incorporating these chips into products often lack visibility into the lower-level components, yet bear the public-facing responsibility when breaches occur. Ultimately, this creates a scenario where each party can potentially shift blame to another link in the chain.

The resulting accountability gap becomes particularly evident during major security incidents. For instance, when widespread vulnerabilities like Specter and Meltdown emerged, the response involved coordinated efforts across multiple companies and took months to address fully. Even more troubling, the responsibility for ongoing security updates remains unclear, particularly for older devices that may no longer receive manufacturer support despite containing vulnerable ARM-based processors.

ARM Chips Are Vulnerable to Side-Channel Attacks

Security researchers continue to uncover sophisticated threats against ARM-based processors, with side-channel attacks representing one of the most concerning vulnerabilities. These attacks exploit subtle behavioral characteristics of chips rather than traditional software flaws, making them particularly difficult to detect and mitigate.

What are side-channel attacks?

Side-channel attacks extract sensitive information by observing physical behaviors of encryption systems during operation. Unlike direct breaches, these attacks monitor indirect data leakage from hardware components themselves. They function by measuring simultaneous hardware emissions that occur during normal processor operations ^[16].

These sophisticated exploits come in several forms:

• Power analysis attacks measure device power consumption during encryption/decryption
• Timing attacks detect tiny variations in how long operations take
• Cache attacks observe memory access patterns
• Electromagnetic attacks capture radiation emitted by processors

The stealth of these attacks makes them particularly dangerous. Side-channel methods don't break into code directly but instead "eavesdrop on the hardware, tracking the subtle ways your processor behaves when executing cryptographic operations" ^[17]. Through statistical analysis of these behavioral patterns, attackers can ultimately extract encryption keys or other protected data.

How Specter and Meltdown affect ARM chips

In 2018, researchers revealed Specter and Meltdown, groundbreaking vulnerabilities affecting virtually all modern processors, including many ARM designs. These attacks exploit speculative execution—a performance optimization technique—to access protected memory ^[18].

Primarily, these vulnerabilities create several concerning attack vectors:

• Variant 1: Bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)
• Variant 2: Branch target injection (CVE-2017-5715)
• Variant 3: Speculative memory reads of inaccessible data (CVE-2017-5754)
• Variant 4: Speculative bypassing of stores (CVE-2018-3639)
• Specter-BHB: Branch history injection (CVE-2022-23960) ^[18]

ARM acknowledged that "according to ARM, some of their processors are also affected" by these vulnerabilities ^[19]. Additionally, researchers subsequently discovered a new side-channel attack type called SLAM (based on Linear Address Masking) that "exploits Intel, ARM, and AMD CPUs" ^[20].

Mitigation efforts and their limitations

ARM's approach to addressing side-channel attacks historically emphasized software solutions over hardware redesigns. As stated in ARM documentation: "Arm's general policy regarding side-channel attacks is to mitigate them in software by discouraging the use of secret-dependent memory accesses or branches in security-sensitive code" ^[21].

Initially, ARM introduced FEAT_CSV2, a mechanism designed to prevent code in one hardware context from leaking to code in different contexts. Yet, this protection proved incomplete. ARM's own analysis confirmed that "under certain conditions, it may be possible for memory addresses in one hardware-defined context to leak to the speculative execution of code in a different hardware-defined context using virtual address-based cache prefetch predictions, even after implementing FEAT_CSV2" ^[21].

Regarding practical defense strategies, experts recommend several approaches:

1. Offloading sensitive operations to dedicated secure elements
2. Implementing constant-time cryptography to prevent timing leaks
3. Randomizing memory access patterns to disrupt cache attacks ^[17]

Nevertheless, ARM openly acknowledges the fundamental challenge: "processor design necessarily requires a balance between security and performance, and vendors are free to determine their risk appetite" ^[21]. This admission highlights the inherent tension between maximizing performance and ensuring security in modern chip architecture.

ARM’s Ubiquity Increases the Attack Surface

The staggering market penetration of ARM architecture represents both its greatest achievement and a significant security liability. With over 225 billion ARM-based chips shipped since the company's founding, these processors have become the backbone of our digital infrastructure.

Where ARM chips are used today

ARM dominates numerous technology sectors through its innovative chip designs. Currently, these processors power:

• 95% of smartphones worldwide, including both Android and Apple devices
• Virtually all tablets and a growing percentage of laptops
• Smart home devices from thermostats to security systems
• Industrial control systems managing critical infrastructure
• Automotive systems controlling everything from entertainment to engine management
• Medical devices including life-supporting equipment
• Nearly all Internet of Things (IoT) devices

This unprecedented adoption stems from ARM's fundamental design philosophy prioritizing energy efficiency without sacrificing computational power, making it ideal for battery-powered and embedded applications across industries.

Why widespread use increases risk

The omnipresence of ARM architecture magnifies security concerns through several mechanisms. Primarily, as the attack surface expands exponentially with each new implementation, the potential entry points for malicious actors multiply accordingly.

Additionally, the diversity of ARM implementations creates inconsistent security landscapes. While premium devices receive regular updates, countless lower-cost products utilizing ARM designs remain permanently vulnerable once flaws are discovered.

Furthermore, the sheer volume of devices creates attractive targets for attackers. When a vulnerability affects billions of devices simultaneously, even a low success rate can compromise millions of systems. This economy of scale makes ARM-based attacks particularly appealing to sophisticated threat actors.

Examples of real-world vulnerabilities

Several major security incidents demonstrate the real-world impact of ARM's widespread adoption. Recently, researchers uncovered "Dirty Pipe" (CVE-2022-0847), a vulnerability affecting ARM-based Linux systems that allowed attackers to overwrite data in read-only files.

Likewise, the PACMAN attack demonstrated how ARM's Pointer Authentication Code could be bypassed on Apple M1 processors. This hardware-based vulnerability potentially compromised systems previously considered highly secure.

In conjunction with these examples, researchers at Google's Project Zero identified multiple vulnerabilities in Mali GPUs found in numerous ARM-based devices, allowing attackers to gain kernel access through seemingly innocuous applications.

Ownership and Control of ARM Raises Geopolitical Concerns

The complex ownership structure of the ARM chip company has sparked international concerns as nations recognize semiconductors as critical infrastructure with profound national security implications.

Who owns ARM chip company?

Japan's SoftBank Group acquired the British chip designer ARM for $32 billion in 2016 ^[22]. Following a failed acquisition attempt by NVIDIA, SoftBank took ARM public with an IPO on the New York Stock Exchange in 2023. Yet, ARM's relationship with China remains particularly complicated. ARM China, a joint venture established in 2018 when SoftBank sold a 51% stake to a Chinese consortium for $775.20 million ^[23], operates semi-independently. Currently, ARM holds just a "4.8% indirect ownership interest in ARM China" through a convoluted structure involving a non-voting stake in a SoftBank-controlled entity ^[24].

How ownership changes affect global security

Whenever ARM's ownership shifts, governments worldwide respond with heightened scrutiny. China contributed a quarter of ARM's revenues in 2023 fiscal year ^[22], leading the company to flag "significant China risk" in its IPO prospectus, mentioning the country over 350 times ^[22]. These concerns aren't merely financial—they reflect deeper geopolitical tensions in semiconductor supply chains.

In response to these sovereignty concerns, some UK politicians proposed that their government take control of a "golden share" of ARM to maintain national influence ^[25]. As former ARM boss Simon Segars noted, the company strives to remain the "Switzerland of the tech industry" by maintaining neutrality ^[25].

The failed NVIDIA acquisition and its implications

NVIDIA's attempted $40 billion acquisition of ARM in 2020 ^[3] collapsed after facing unprecedented regulatory opposition. The UK government intervened on national security grounds, with Digital Secretary Oliver Dowden stating they needed to "properly consider the national security implications" ^[3]. Simultaneously, the US Federal Trade Commission sued to block the deal, arguing it would "harm competition" and "stifle innovative next-generation technologies" ^[8].

ARM co-founder Hermann Hauser warned the acquisition would shift critical export control decisions: "The decision on whether hundreds of UK companies that use ARM processors can export their products anywhere in the world will be made in the White House, not in Downing Street" ^[3].

Comparison Table

Security Concern	Main Risk/Issue	Key Affected Components	Primary Security Implications	Notable Examples/Incidents	Mitigation Approaches
Undocumented Instructions	Hidden processor operations not documented in official specifications	Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)	System instability, potential bypass of hardware security protections	Operation Triangulation exploit in Apple SoCs	Not specifically mentioned
Hidden Subsystems	Independent processing environments operating without user awareness	Security subsystems, key storage, encryption engines	Autonomous operation with privileged access, potential for unauthorized surveillance	TIKTAG attacks on Chrome, Linux kernel, Google Pixel 8	Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)
Closed-Source Firmware	Proprietary code that cannot be inspected or verified	Boot sequences, security modules, protocol stacks	Prevents independent security audits, creates accountability gaps	Binary blobs required for device operation	Open-source alternatives (where possible)
Licensing Model Complexity	Diffused responsibility across multiple parties	Architecture, processor designs, physical IP	Complicated security oversight, unclear accountability	Specter/Meltdown response delays	Not specifically mentioned
Side-Channel Attacks	Information leakage through hardware behavior	Processor operations, cache, power consumption	Extraction of sensitive data through indirect observation	Specter, Meltdown, SLAM attacks	FEAT_CSV2, constant-time cryptography
Widespread Adoption	Expanded attack surface due to ubiquitous deployment	Smartphones, IoT devices, industrial systems	Multiplied entry points for attacks, inconsistent security landscapes	Dirty Pipe vulnerability, PACMAN attack	Regular updates (for premium devices)
Ownership Control	Geopolitical tensions over chip design control	Corporate ownership, international operations	National security implications, export control concerns	Failed NVIDIA acquisition	Proposed "golden share" control

Conclusion

Security concerns surrounding ARM chip architecture demand serious attention as these processors continue to dominate global computing infrastructure. Though ARM-based systems power everything from smartphones to medical devices, users generally remain unaware of the significant vulnerabilities lurking beneath their sleek exteriors. Undocumented instructions, hidden subsystems, and closed-source firmware create potential attack vectors that sophisticated adversaries could exploit without detection.

ARM's complex licensing model additionally complicates accountability when vulnerabilities emerge. Different companies handle various aspects of implementation, resulting in a fragmented responsibility chain where each party can potentially deflect blame elsewhere. This diffusion of responsibility often delays critical security patches, leaving billions of devices vulnerable for extended periods.

Side-channel attacks represent another serious threat to ARM-based systems. Vulnerabilities like Specter and Meltdown have demonstrated how speculative execution features can be weaponized to extract sensitive information from protected memory areas. Despite mitigation efforts, ARM's own documentation acknowledges the fundamental tension between performance optimization and security hardening.

The ubiquity of ARM architecture fundamentally magnifies these security concerns. With over 225 billion ARM-based chips deployed worldwide across countless industries, successful exploits can potentially compromise millions of systems simultaneously. This massive attack surface provides compelling incentives for malicious actors to develop sophisticated ARM-specific attacks.

Geopolitical tensions further complicate the security landscape as nations increasingly view semiconductor technology as critical infrastructure with national security implications. Ownership changes and market access restrictions could potentially affect availability of security updates or introduce new vulnerabilities through supply chain compromises.

Understanding these hidden security risks becomes essential for organizations deploying ARM-based technologies. Security teams must recognize that modern computing infrastructure stands built upon complex systems where transparency remains limited and vulnerabilities often exist by design rather than accident. Until hardware manufacturers prioritize security transparency over proprietary protection, users will continue facing unnecessary risks from the very chips powering our digital world.

FAQs

Q1. What are some hidden security risks in ARM-based processors? ARM chips may contain undocumented instructions, hidden subsystems, and closed-source firmware that can potentially be exploited by attackers. These hidden elements can bypass security protections and operate without user awareness.

Q2. How does ARM's licensing model impact security? ARM's complex licensing structure involving multiple parties can obscure accountability when vulnerabilities are discovered. This fragmented responsibility often delays critical security patches, leaving devices vulnerable for extended periods.

Q3. Are ARM chips vulnerable to side-channel attacks? Yes, ARM processors are susceptible to side-channel attacks like Specter and Meltdown. These attacks exploit subtle behavioral characteristics of chips to extract sensitive information, making them particularly difficult to detect and mitigate.

Q4. Why does ARM's widespread adoption increase security risks? The ubiquity of ARM architecture in billions of devices worldwide creates an enormous attack surface. Successful exploits can potentially compromise millions of systems simultaneously, making ARM-based attacks particularly appealing to sophisticated threat actors.

Q5. How do ownership changes of ARM affect global security? Changes in ARM's ownership structure raise geopolitical concerns as nations view semiconductor technology as critical infrastructure. This can impact the availability of security updates and potentially introduce new vulnerabilities through supply chain compromises.

References

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[2] - https://www.ainvest.com/news/arm-holdings-stock-soars-looming-security-flaws-industry-challenges-2505/
[3] - https://news.sky.com/story/government-intervenes-in-sale-of-uk-chip-designer-arm-over-national-security-implications-12280485
[4] - https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/126188/closed-source-binary-blobs-in-chipsets-privacy-threat
[5] - https://cybernews.com/security/attackers-bypassing-arm-memory-corruption-protection/
[6] - https://ntnuopen.ntnu.no/ntnu-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2777912/no.ntnu:inspera:57320302:21095830.pdf?sequence=1
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[8] - https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2022/02/statement-regarding-termination-nvidia-corps-attempted-acquisition-arm-ltd
[9] - https://www.securityweek.com/new-tiktag-attack-targets-arm-cpu-security-feature/
[10] - https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/03/hackers-can-extract-secret-encryption-keys-from-apples-mac-chips/
[11] - https://www.simplerisk.com/blog/security-open-source-vs-closed-source-software
[12] - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360006834_FirmWire_Transparent_Dynamic_Analysis_for_Cellular_Baseband_Firmware
[13] - https://patents.google.com/patent/WO2015093671A1/en
[14] - https://www.eng.auburn.edu/~uguin/pdfs/IoTJ-2019.pdf
[15] - https://www.nozominetworks.com/blog/reverse-engineering-obfuscated-firmware-for-vulnerability-analysis
[16] - https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-025-98473-3
[17] - https://medium.com/tech-vibes/securing-flutter-apps-from-side-channel-attacks-on-arm-processors-cf772d600517
[18] - https://developer.arm.com/documentation/110280/latest/
[19] - https://meltdownattack.com/
[20] - https://stellarix.com/insights/articles/mitigation-techniques-of-side-channel-attacks/
[21] - https://developer.arm.com/documentation/110339/latest/
[22] - https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3232051/softbank-backed-arm-warns-significant-china-risk-mentioning-country-350-times-its-ipo-prospectus
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